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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey is comprised of a selection of
the major cases decided last term dealing with criminal law and procedure.
Since the Tenth Circuit decided more than fifty criminal cases during our
survey period, this section is at best a sampling of cases. Thus, the reader
should not expect to find treatment of every criminal case handed down by
the appellate court. Likewise, the reader who expects an indepth analysis of
each of the cases presented will be disappointed. Rather, this section at-
tempts to deal with the most important and interesting cases in a way which
will assist the practitioner in meaningful research in a given area of law.
The section is divided into six categories: Sixth Amendment, Fourth
Amendment, Statutory Interpretation, Fifth Amendment, Post-trial Pro-
ceedings, and Trial Matters.
I. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Speedy Trial
In United States v. Askew,I the Tenth Circuit dealt with the defendant's
claim that he had been deprived of his sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial. The defendant was indicted in December 1974 on three counts of in-
terstate transportation of forged securities. 2 He was tried and convicted on
all counts in May, 1977, about two and a half years after the initial indict-
ment.
3
The trial court had granted the defendant a number of continuances
based on his poor health. Further, Askew was ordered to provide the Gov-
ernment with handwriting exemplars in June, 1975. His refusal to do so
resulted in the trial court finding him in contempt.4 In February, 1977, the
defendant moved for a dismissal of the charges, alleging that he had been
deprived his right to a speedy trial. The motion was denied and the Govern-
ment subsequently decided to try the case without the benefit of the re-
quested handwriting samples.
The Tenth Circuit, citing Barker v. Wingo, 5 held that the defendant had
not been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Noting that the defendant
had caused the greater part of the delay in bringing the case to trial, the
1. 584 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. deneid, 99 S. Ct. 1054 (1979).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
3. 584 F.2d at 961-62.
4. Id. at 962.
5. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Under Barker the Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case ap-
proach in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial.
The Court cited four factors which are to be considered in the determination: (1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the
prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530. See also Rudstein, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v.
Wingo in the Lower Courts, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 11.
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court emphasized that he had produced no evidence at his trial and had
made "no showing that his defense was at all prejudiced by the delay."
'6
Defendant's alleged ill health and his refusal to comply with the trial court's
order for production of the exemplars were the primary reasons for the de-
lay. However, the court conceded that the proceedings were delayed at one
point due to the unavailability of government witnesses and "conflicting ob-
ligations" of the prosecutor. The court held, citing Barker, that these reasons
were sufficient to justify some delay. 7 In denying the defendant's sixth
amendment claim, the court held that the "total circumstances presented"
did not rise to the level of a deprivation of the defendants right to a speedy
trial.8
B. Confrontation
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Roberts,9 faced the question of
whether the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him ° was
violated by the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The two defend-
ants were tried jointly for importing heroin and for conspiring to import
heroin.'e At trial, tape recordings of telephone conversations between de-
fendant Roberts and an unindicted coconspirator were introduced into evi-
dence against both Roberts and defendant Freeman. In the course of the
conversations several passing references concerning Freeman were made by
Roberts. Freeman's attorney objected to the introduction of the tapes, but
on grounds other than the constitutional issue raised here on appeal.
12
The Tenth Circuit, in holding that the conversations were admissible
against Freeman, distinguished Bruton on the basis that in the instant case,
unlike Bruton, the coconspirator exception 13 to the hearsay rule rendered the
statements admissible. The court reasoned that any testimony which is ad-
missible via an exception to the hearsay rule falls outside the purview of
Bruton. The court noted, however, that the hearsay rule cannot be viewed as
a substitute for the confrontation clause.'
4
6. 584 F.2d at 963. Normally the appellant may not claim denial of his right to a speedy
trial when he is the cause of the delay. See United States v. Key, 458 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 927 (1972).
7. 584 F.2d at 962.
8. Id. at 963. See also United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1047 (1974). The court also relied on the fact that the appellant had not been incar-
cerated during most of the time the charge was pending. 584 F.2d at 962. See also Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532.
9. 583 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 862 (1979).
10. This right was set forth by the Supreme Court in Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
11. 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 962(a), 963 (1976).
12. 583 F.2d at 1175. The court commented that normally a confrontation clause objec-
tion must be raised at trial in order for the issue to be preserved for appellate review. See Nolan
v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1041 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970). How-
ever, since the Government failed to challenge the appellant's claim on preservation grounds,
the Tenth Circuit proceeded to the merits. See United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
13. 583 F.2d at 1175.
14. Id. at 1175-76. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); United States v.
Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974). See generally Baker, The
Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and Due IProcess-A Proposal for Deterntning When Hearsay
May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529-57 (1974).
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After examining the trial record, the Tenth Circuit found that Free-
man's rights under the confrontation clause had been adequately protected.
In so holding, the court pointed to the fact that the tapes contained only a
few references to Freeman; that previous testimony had already established a
sufficient nexus between the crimes charged and Freeman's involvement in
them; that the evidence provided ample basis for "the jury to test the believ-
ability of Robert's references to Freema;" and that no reason could be in-
ferred from the record that would indicate why Roberts would have
misrepresented Freeman's involvement in the importation ring. 15 Indeed,
the court noted that any possible questions or ambiguity created by the
taped references to Freeman could only have assisted his case "in the face of
strong independent evidence of guilt.'
16
C. Right to Counsel
In Baldwin v. Benson' 7 the Tenth Circuit, construing 18 U.S.C. section
4214 and 18 U.S.C. section 3006,18 significantly enlarged the right to counsel
of federal parolees at parole revocation proceedings and overruled several of
its previously unpublished decisions. Both petitioners in Baldwin had re-
quested that counsel be appointed for them before or at the time of the hear-
ing to revoke parole. Both requests were denied, based upon the
interpretation that section 4214 was to be read "in accordance with" section
3006A.' 9 The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the sixth
amendment requires the federal government to provide counsel to an indi-
gent defendant at "every stage of a criminal proceeding which involves sub-
stantial rights." 20 The court noted, however, that the Supreme Court had
held 2' that parole revocation proceedings are not part of criminal prosecu-
tions to the extent that appointment of counsel is required.2 2 Yet the Tenth
Circuit was quick to point out that Mornss antedated the enactment of
section 4212.23
Relying primarily upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mood v.
Daggett,24 the legislative history of the Parole Act,2 5 and the language of
section 4214(b),2 6 the court held that a parolee is entitled to appointed coun-
15. 583 F.2d at 1176-77.
16. Id. at 1177.
17. 584 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1978).
18. Section 3006A(g) specifically authorizes the trial court to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether to appoint counsel for the parolee.
19. 584 F.2d at 955.
20. Id. (citing Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938)).
21. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
22. 584 F.2d at 955. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 480.
23. 584 F.2d at 956.
24. 429 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1976).
25. 584 F.2d 956-57.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(2)(B) (1976) reads:
[O]pportunity for the parolee to be represented by an attorney (retained by the
parolee, or if he is financially unable to retain counsel), counsel shall be provided
pursuant to section 3006(A) or, if he so chooses, a representative as provided by rules




sel if properly requested. 27 The Tenth Circuit, seizing upon the phrase
"shall be provided counsel," stated that the "new parole act undertakes to
provide for due process at every stage of the proceedings, and in this connec-
tion it provides for the right to counsel at each stage."'28 The court also
noted that the new act requires that notice be given to the parolee of the
pending revocation proceeding and that, where requested, counsel be pro-
vided, not only at the revocation hearing, but with respect to other actions
taken incident to such revocation.
29
In closing, the court noted a line of its decisions, many of which were
unpublished, which had reached a contrary conclusion. The Tenth Circuit




In United States v. Stevens 3' the Tenth Circuit ruled that the consent to
search given by the defendant to police officers was voluntary and thus evi-
dence obtained by the search was admissible at defendant's trial for posses-
sion of an unregistered firearm. 32 The facts in the case indicated that police,
in response to a call, went to a motel room where the defendant was staying.
The officers informed the defendant that they had been told a person in the
motel had a shotgun and had threatened to kill someone. The policemen
then asked the defendant if they could "look around for the shotgun." The
defendant gave his consent and the officers found the shotgun in a suitcase
under some clothing.
33
Prior to trial the defendant moved to suppress the firearm, alleging that
it was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. The defendant attempted to
buttress this contention by emphasizing his youth, his lack of education, and
the fact that he was neither advised nor was he aware that he could resist the
search and insist that a search warrant be obtained. 34 The government, con-
ceding the lack of a search warrant, relied upon the defendant's consent to
the search. Defendant's motion to suppress was denied by the trial court,
but was raised again at trial when the gun was offered into evidence. Again
the trial court overruled the objection, the gun was admitted into evidence,
and the defendant was convicted.
35
The Tenth Circuit, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,3 6 noted that the Gov-
ernment, in the consent search context, is not required to show that the de-
27. 584 F.2d at 957-58.
28. Id. at 957.
29. Id. at 958.
30. Id. at 959. See Robinson v. Benson, 570 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1978); Cotner v. United
States, 409 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1969).
31. 595 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1979).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976).
33. 595 F.2d at 570. The appellant later testified he gave his consent only after officers had
begun the search.
34. Id. at 570-71.
35. Id. at 570.
36. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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fendant knew he could refuse to give his consent, nor that he was advised of
his right to refuse consent. 37 Rather, the court turned its inquiry to the issue
of the voluntariness of the consent and looked to the totality of the circum-
stances. Quoting Schneckloth the court held that: "Voluntariness is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the
subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account,
the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequi-
site to establishing a voluntary consent."' 38 The appellate court, relying
upon the above quoted language, ruled that the decision of the trial court
was in accord with the principles enunciated in Schneckloth.
39
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming Stevens' conviction, then distinguished
United States v. Rodriguez,40 as a situation involving acquiescence by a person
who spoke little English in the face of a claim of lawful authority, and Vt'/ano
v. Unt'edStates,4 ' in which the consent was tainted by the fact the defendant
was in custody at the time of the consent, and by several factors amounting
to express coercion.
B. Warrantless Searches
In Uni'ted States v. Erb,42 the Tenth Circuit validated a warrantless "lim-
ited protective search" of a private residence conducted by federal drug
agents who suspected that the manufacture of narcotics was taking place.
The court found the existence of both probable cause for the search and
exigent circumstances sufficient to vitiate the necessity of obtaining a search
warrant.
43
In Erb, a reliable informant had told drug agents that a certain Corwin
was engaged in the manufacture of drugs. One evening, agents followed
Corwin and were lead to a residential structure in Denver, Colorado. Al-
most immediately upon arrival, the agents detected the strong odor of ether,
a substance often used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, ema-
nating from the residence. Various persons, including Corwin, entered and
left the house during the course of the officer's observation. 44 At about 1
a.m., approximately three hours after the drug agents had begun their sur-
veillance of the home, one of the agents contacted the reliable informant by
telephone. The informant told the officer that the manufacture of drugs was
under way inside the house and was scheduled to be completed by 8 a.m.
that day. Shortly after 2:30 a.m. Corwin again arrived at the residence. The
agents became concerned that the manufacturing process was nearing com-
pletion more rapidly than they had expected. They believed that Corwin
had arrived to pick up his "share" of the drugs.45 Officers also feared that
37. 595 F.2d at 571.
38. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49).
39. 595 F.2d at 571.
40. 525 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1975).
41. 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962).
42. 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1979).
43. Id. at 417.
44. d. at 414-15.
45. Id. at 415.
1980]
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the drug manufacturing mechanisms and materials, which they believed the
home contained, were about to be dismantled and removed. The agents
discussed the situation and came to the conclusion that a search warrant for
the home could not be obtained for about five hours, far too late to seize the
drug laboratory intact. During all of this time the officers were unable to see
anything taking place inside the residence.
46
Shortly before 3 a.m. the officers forcibly entered the home, arrested the
occupants, secured the premises, insured that the chemicals posed no threat
of explosion, and then, with the arrested persons, left the house.4 7 Some
drug agents remained outside the home, to prevent any tampering with ei-
ther the house or the laboratory within, until a search warrant for the prem-
ises was obtained and executed. 48 At the appellants' trial, the laboratory
items and assorted chemicals, commonly used in the manufacture of drugs,
were introduced into evidence against the defendants.
The Tenth Circuit found, on the basis of the facts set out above, that (1)
the officers had probable cause to make the forced entry, arrest the appel-
lants, and secure the premises; and (2) the exigent circumstances present
here justified them doing so without a search warrant. 49 Further, the court
emphasized that after securing the premises the agents had obtained a
search warrant before seizing the lab equipment and chemicals. Thus, the
court reasoned, no violence had been done to the fourth amendment. 50
Without squarely dealing with the issue, the court also stated, citing
United States v. Watson,5 that government agents, armed with probable
cause, may, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, search public
places without a search warrant. While not explicitly so holding, the court
noted that although the building in the instant case was a house, it could
hardly be considered a "family abode or dwelling" in view of the fact the
structure was being used for the clandestine manufacture of a controlled sub-
stance. 52 Therefore, the court implied that Watson might be applicable in
circumstances like those present in Erb.
In a concurring opinion, Judge McKay balked at the idea that this
holding of the court might be construed as stating that a warrantless search
of a private residence might be justified absent exigent circumstances5 3 or
that the place searched in Erb could be construed to be a public building.
54
C. Statements of the Accused
In Gamble v. Oklahoma,55 the Tenth Circuit granted the petitioner habeas
46. Id.
47. Id. at 415-16.
48. Id. at 416.
49. Id. at 417.
50. Id. at 417-18.
51. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). The public place in Watson was, however, a restaurant. Id.
52. Id. at 420. See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
53. 596 F.2d at 422 (McKay, J., concurring).
54. Judge McKay commented that he did not believe the court's decision went as far as
holding the house in Erb was a public place. Thus, the judge apparently felt that the court's
discussion of Watson was merely dictum. Id.
55. 583 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 57:2
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corpus relief after determining that statements made by him, extracted in
the context of a fourth amendment violation, had been improperly intro-
duced against him at his trial in state court. The facts indicated that the
petitioner had been illegally arrested and transported by police at gunpoint
to his home. Here the officers, pursuant to a search warrant which they had
previously obtained, searched the home. The search turned up evidence of
drug dealing, and the officers also found a locked brief case. 56 The police
asked petitioner for the key to the case. After first denying any knowledge of
the key, the petitioner made "inculpatory statements" to officers, telling
them where they could find the key. The case was opened and found to
contain drug related evidence which was damaging to the petitioner.57 The
law enforcement officers then asked the petitioner if there were any other
drugs in the house, adding that if they did not receive the petitioner's coop-
eration in the search they "would tear the house apart,"58 and the petitioner
then made further inculpatory statements which lead the officers to addi-
tional drug-related evidence. Sometime during the search the officers for-
mally arrested the petitioner and read him a Miranda warning.
59
The Oklahoma courts suppressed the statements made by the petitioner
prior to the time that he had received the Miranda warning. They held,
however, that his statements following the Miranda warning were admissible
against him. 6° The petitioner was convicted of unlawful possession of drugs
and unlawful possession of drugs with the intent to distribute them. Upon
reaching the merits of the case, 6 ' the Tenth Circuit noted that although the
evidence challenged here consisted in part of oral statements made by the
accused, he was nevertheless entitled to fourth amendment protection.
62
The court also stated that the situation in the instant case was controlled by
Brown v. IlInoi 63 which had held that Miranda warnings alone could not
obviate the taint of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
64
Since from the record before the court it appeared that the Oklahoma courts
had not followed, and perhaps even ignored Brown, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the federal district court's order that Oklahoma either release the
petitioner or give him a new trial.
6 5
56. Id. at 1162-63.
57. Id. at 1163.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court does not indicate just when the Miranda warnings were given to the
appellant. Compare the statement of facts given by the Oklahoma court on the petitioner's direct
appeal in Gamble v. State, 546 P.2d 1336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
60. 583 F.2d at 1163.
61. Before reaching the merits, the court determined that the constitutional issue had not
been fully and fairly litigated by the parties in the state courts. Thus, the petitioner was allowed
to raise his substantive claim in federal court. Id. at 1163-64. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 312-13 (1963). See also Note, Appyzng Stone v. Powell: Full and Fair Lit'gation of a Fourth
Amendment Habeas Corpus Claim, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 319 (1978).
62. With reference to the rule that oral statements are entitled to protection under the
fourth amendment, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975).
63. 422 U.S. 590.
64. Id. at 603-04. See Note, Criminal Lau---Giving of Mianda Warning Does Not Per Se Purge the
Taint of an Unlawful Arrest and Render Post Arrest Statements Admissible, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 513-20
(1975).




A. 18 US C §922
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Kilburn,66had occasion to interpret
18 U.S.C. § 922(h)67 in light of an alleged intrastate purchase of a firearm.
The appellant had been convicted of receiving a firearm after a previous
felony conviction in violation of the statute. On appeal he argued that, since
his roundabout purchase of the weapon had taken place entirely within the
state of Utah, the purchase and possession of the gun was a totally intrastate
transaction thus rendering section 922 inapplicable.
68
Following Barrett v. United States,69 the Tenth Circuit rejected this nar-
row reading of the statute. The court held that a showing that the firearm
had moved at any time in interstate commerce was sufficient to meet the
jurisdictional requirement of the statute and to sustain a conviction under
it.
70
In United States v. Brzoticky,7 1 the Tenth Circuit interpreted the prior
conviction provision of section 922(h). 72 The trial court dismissed the case,
holding that, since the prior conviction of the defendant in a state court had
been secured by a nolo contendere plea which was expunged before the appel-
lant's trial in federal court, section 922(h) did not apply. The Tenth Circuit,
in setting aside the dismissal and remanding the case to the trial court, first
noted that state law rather than federal law controlled the question of
whether appellant had a prior conviction within the meaning of section 922.
Thus, the court turned to Colorado law and held that under that state's law
a nolo plea results in a "conviction" for the accused. 73 The court then deter-
mined that, because the expungement of the appellant's previous conviction
took place after the section 922 charges were filed against him, he could still
be considered, for the purchase of the charges at bar, to have a prior convic-
tion.
74
66. 596 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. atem'd, 99 S. Ct. 1517 (1979).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; (or)
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed
to any mental institution; to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
68. 596 F.2d at 931. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) [construing § 922(h)'s
predecessor, a statute similar to § 922(h)].
69. 423 U.S. 212 (1975).
70. 596 F.2d 933-34. The court also discussed the relationship of § 922 to provisions of
Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a). Id.
at 932-34; 423 U.S. at 216. For a discussion of the latter see Note, The Government Must Specifwally
Allege and Prove That Possession of Firearms is "In Commerce or Affecting Commerce" Under Title VII of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 9 Hous. L. REV. 160 (1971); Note, Interstate
Commerce Nexus Requirement Definedfor Firearm Possession by Felons, 29 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1977-
78).
71. 588 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1978).
72. See note 67 supra.
73. 588 F.2d at 775.
74. Id.
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Judge Doyle concurred only in the result reached by the majority. The
judge argued that federal law controlled, criticizing the majority's reasoning
since it allowed, in his opinion, "the state definition of conviction to deter-
mine whether an element in a federal crime has been proven."' 75 Then,
turning to federal law, Judge Doyle determined that the appellant's nolo plea
was a conviction for the purposes of section 922.76
B. 18 USC § 641
In United States v. Leavitt7 7 the appellants were convicted of the theft of
logs from the government. 78 The men ran a timber business and had a con-
tract for the purchase of logs from the federal government. Among their
grounds for appeal, defendants alleged that, based upon their contract with
the government, theft from the government was legally impossible in the
case since (1) the government did not own the logs at the time they were
taken by the appellants; or in the alternative, (2) the government had con-
sented to the taking of the timber.
79
After examining the relevant portion of the contract in question, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the title to the logs had not passed to the de-
fendants, and therefore, the appellants' first claim failed.8 0 Turning to the
second contention the court stated, citing Morissette v. United States,," that
they would not be bound by the common law definitions of theft, but where
theft was defined broadly, as in the instant case, it should be construed by
the courts. In ruling on the second point against the appellants the court
held that the government, by merely consenting to the possession of its prop-
erty by the appellants, had not thereby consented to their theft of the prop-
erty.
8 2
75. Id. (Doyle, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 776-78. See also United States v. Place, 561 F.2d 213 (10th Cir.), cert. dentid, 434
U.S. 1000 (1977).
77. 599 F.2d 355 (10th Cir. 1979).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976) provides in part: "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or
knowingly converts to his use or the use of another,, any record, voucher, money, or thing of
value of the United States or any department or agency thereof,. . . [s]hall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both ... At the Leavitt-Johnson
trial the Government's evidence indicated that the appellants had converted logs worth about
$29,000. 599 F.2d at 359.
79. 599 F.2d at 359-60.
80. Id. at 359-60. A portion of the contract read:
All right, title, and interest in and to any Included Timber shall remain in Forest
Service until it has been cut, Scaled, removed from Sale Area or other designated
cutting area and paid for, at which time title shall vest in purchaser. For purposes of
this Subsection, timber cut under cash deposit, Effective Purchaser Credit or payment
guarantee under B4.3 shall be considered to have been paid for.
Id. at 359. This language coupled with the appellants' having obtained $30,000 surety bond
was the basis of the appellants' legal impossibility argument which was rejected by the court.
81. 342 U.S. 246, 271 (1952).
82. 599 F.2d at 360. The appellants also argued that the Government's criminal case must
fail and that it was instead limited to a suit for breach of contract. The Tenth Circuit found
this argument to be without merit. Id. at 360-61. See also United States v. Dupee, 569 F.2d
1061 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 268 U.S. 220 (1925).
1980]
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C. 16 US.C § 703
In United States v. Conners,8 3 appellant, in the course of a Colorado Re-
trievers Club field trial, shot and killed a number of mallards which had
flown uninvited into a lake thus invading and disrupting the contest. He
was convicted of killing migratory birds. The Tenth Circuit looked to inter-
national treaties between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan and to
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regulations to determine if under 16 U.S.C.
§ 70384 the birds protected were required to be "wild" or merely "captive-
reared." The court seized upon the fact that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service's regulations defining "migratory game birds" made specific refer-
ence to wild ducks.8 5 Then the court remanded the case to the trial court for
a determination of whether the dead ducks had been wild, in which case the
appellant's conviction would be affirmed, or whether they had been captive-
reared, in which case the appellant's conviction could not stand. In doing so,
the court distinguished United States v. Richards86 on the basis that in the
latter case the birds in question were falconidae, and therefore not members
of the duck family.
8 7
Judge Holloway stated in dissent that he would draw no fine distinc-
tion, as the majority did, between the terms "wild" and "captive-reared."'88
D. 18 US C § 841()
Noting that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and that ambi-
guities are to be resolved in favor of the accused, the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Schwanke, 89 dealt with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 844.9o The ap-
pellants were charged and convicted of destroying a building by the use of
83. 606 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1979).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976) reads in part:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in
this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to
pursue, hunt, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter,
barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment . .. any migratory bird . . *
included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain
for the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat. 1702), the
United States and the United Mexican States for the protection of migratory birds
and game mammals concluded February 7, 1936, and the United States and the Gov-
ernment of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinc-
tion, and their environment concluded March 4, 1972.
85. 606 F.2d at 272. The court also pointed to similar language contained in the treaties.
Id. at 271.
86. 583 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1978).
87. 606 F.2d at 272 n.4.
88. Id. at 273-74. (Holloway, J., dissenting).
89. 598 F.2d 575, 579 (10th Cir. 1979). See alro United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411
(1973).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1976) reads:
(i) Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy,
by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used
in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000
or both; and if personal injury results shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty
years or fined not more than $20,000, or both; and if death results shall also be subject
to imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment
as provided in section 34 of this title.
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an explosive. Pursuant to the statute's provisions two of the defendants'
sentences were enhanced since the one defendant who had physically de-
stroyed the building had injured himself in doing so.9 1 Analogizing the case
to those involving the felony-murder doctrine,9 2 the court concluded that
the punishment could not be enhanced in situations where the only individ-
ual injured by the blast was the person responsible for the building's de-
mise.
93
In a footnote, Judge Barrett dissented from the above holding, basing
his analysis upon the relevant language of the statute. Thus, he believed the
term " 'if personal injury results' could not be equated with the term 'injured
person.' "94
Before reaching the issue discussed above, the majority determined that
the destroyed building, located in Oklahoma, was protected by federal law.
This was so because the building had housed a store which had purchased
candy, gum, and vegetables from Arkansas. Thus, the interstate commerce
provision of section 844 had been satisfied since Congress had the power to
regulate interstate commerce even though the effect on interstate commerce
was de minimis.
9 5
E. 8 USC. § 641
The argument advanced by the appellant in United States v. Larsen96 was
that he had been convicted of theft of government property under a general
statute, providing for a stiff punishment, when a more specific statute made
the same activity a misdemeanor with a less serious punishment. 9 7 The ap-
pellant was conviicted of stealing government timber under the general theft
statute and argued that the existence of a specific statute precluded prosecu-
tion under the more general statute. The Tenth Circuit cited the well
known rule that the same transaction may constitute two or more offenses as
long as each offense requires some proof of an element not required in the
91. 598 F.2d at 578-79.
92. See, e.g., People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928); Commonwealth v. Redline,
391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). For discussions of the felony-murder doctrine and the con-
cept of vicarious criminal liability, see generally Comment, Criminal Law--Homicde-Feony-Mur-
der-Felons can be Held Responsible Under the NewJerse Murder Statute for the Death of an Innocent Party
Killed by Police Attemfpting to Apprehend the Felons, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 591 (1970); Cnminal Law-
Murder-Flony Murder Rule, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 122 (1970); Felony Murder-Felon Not Responsiblefor
Accidental Death of Bystander Shot by Pohce, 74 DICK. L. REv. 756 (1970); and Criminal Law-
Felony-Murder- Vicarious Liablity--A Felon Can Be Held Responsible For a Murder Committed by a Fear-
Motivated Victim)--Responsibihity is Based on a Theory of Vicarious Liabilit and Not Felony-Murder, 3 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 158 (1971).
93. 598 F.2d at 579.
94. Id. at 580 n.3.
95. Id. at 578.
96. 596 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1979).
97. For a reading of the theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976), see note 78 supra. The statute
covering the unlawful cutting of government timber, 18 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976), reads in part:
Whoever cuts, or wantonly destroys any timber growing on the public lands of the
United States; or
Whoever removes any timber from said public lands, with intent to export or to dis-
pose of the same; ....
Shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
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other98 and affirmed the appellant's conviction. Further, the court empha-
sized the fact that the statutes, as separate and distinct laws, were aimed at
different evils.99
F. 15 U.S.C § 1644
Whether federal jurisdiction is conferred, bringing section 1644100 into
play, when intrastate purchases are made with a credit card stolen in the
same state where the purchases were made, but the goods purchased have
moved in interstate commerce, was the question presented in United States v.
Lomax.5 0' In Lomax, the defendant had used a credit card stolen in Kansas
to make a number of purchases in that state. At trial, the government
showed that the invoices for the items purchases with the stolen card had
been sent to a credit card records center in Kansas City, Missouri. Before
affirming the appellant's conviction the Tenth Circuit noted, as had the
Supreme Court in United States v. Maze, 0 2 the staggering proportions and
costs to which the fraudulent credit card problem had grown. 103
Relying on the broad language of the statute and upon the fact that
there had been at least a minimal affect on interstate commerce, the court
held that this effect on interstate commerce was sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion under the statute. 104
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Due Process
In United States v. Ghst, 10 5 the Tenth Circuit considered the question of
whether pre-indictment delay caused by the Government, coupled with a
general pattern of unfair practices used by government agents to build a case
against the appellants, resulted in a denial of due process. The trial court
had dismissed the charges 10 6 against the defendants calling them "stale" and
holding that the appellants had been the victims of prejudicial pre-indict-
98. 596 F.2d at 411. See also United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1974).
99. 596 F.2d at 411. See United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir.), cert. dented,
429 U.S. 982 (1976).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1976) reads in part:
Whoever knowingly in a transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
uses or attempts or conspires to use any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost,
stolen, or fraudulently obtained credit card to obtain money, goods, services, or any-
thing else of value which within any one-year period has a value aggregating of 51,000
or more;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
101. 598 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1979).
102. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
103. See 598 F.2d at 583 n.2 (citing Maze, 414 U.S. at 416 (White, J., dissenting)).
104. 598 F.2d at 584.
105. 594 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1979).
106. The court first addressed the issue of whether the Government could appeal the dismis-
sal. The Tenth Circuit commented that an appeal was possible only if jeopardy had not at-
tached. Due to the fact that the court resolved the case on the grounds of pre-indictment delay,
it reached no determination of the double jeopardy issue. Id. at 1376-77.
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ment delay by the Government. 0 7 The Tenth Circuit held that the findings
of the trial court were supported by the record. But the court noted, " 'proof
of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due proc-
ess claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the
delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.' "o108 Further, the court noted
that more than mere negligence on the part of the Government is required
before the prejudice to the defendant can rise to the level of a denial of due
process sufficient to justify dismissal of an indictment. 10 9
Citing numerous faults with the government agents' handling of the
investigation; ite., the fact that the Government's files on the case were scat-
tered "among many people and offices," the fact that government officials
had not listened to nor read various materials alleged to contain evidence
exculpatory to the defendants, and the fact that a government agent had cut
off a transcript of a tape shortly before an exculpatory statement was made
concerning one of the appellants, the court found grounds sufficient to affirm
the lower court's dismissal of the charges against the appellants." 0
B. Se/f-Incrimination
In United States v. Bridwell,' 1' a physician challenged his conviction for
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. 1 2 One of the grounds he
urged on appeal was that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence
certain of his statements concerning his drug inventories, which were made
to investigators during the course of an audit of the doctor's office. The
appellant contended that he should have been given a Miranda warning
prior to the questioning by the agents. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argu-
ment, noting that Miranda v. Arizona' '1 applied only to custodial interroga-
tions. 114  The court analogized Bridwell's case with Beckwith v. United
States," 5 in which the court rejected arguments that the Miranda warnings
should be given once the investigation had "focused" upon a defendant or
that the warnings are required when a subject is placed under "mental re-
straint." 16 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence against Bridwell
was properly admitted.
107. Id. at 1377.
108. Id. at 1378 (citing United States v. Lavasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)). See Comment,
Criminal Procedure. Due Process Requires Dismissal of Charges Where Government Pre-lntctiment Delay
Prudtices Defendant, 61 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1977).
109. 594 F.2d at 1378. See also United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Revada, 574 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1978).
110. 594 F.2d at 1378.
111. 583 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1978).
112. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976). Dr. Bridwell was also convicted of distributing
controlled substances in violation of § 841(a)(1) and of failure to maintain accurate records
regarding the dispensing of the drugs in violation of § 842(a)(5).
113. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114. 583 F.2d at 1138. The court commented that the Miranda court had held the warnings
must be given when a suspect "'has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of actions in any significant way.' " Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). See also Note,
Crimtnal Procedure-Defining "Custodial Interrogation"for the Purposes of Miranda, 57 OR. L. REV.
184 (1977).
115. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
116. 583 F.2d at 1138. See also Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 345.
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The court did, however, find error in the trial court's allowing into evi-
dence the testimony of a government agent that the defendant had refused
to sign a form waiving his Miranda rights, holding that such was improper
evidence of a defendant's silence, because of his fifth amendment rights.
1 17
But the appellate court held, that based upon the trial court's immediate
instruction to the jury to disregard the above mentioned testimony, and the
strong evidence of the accused's guilt, the error was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and, therefore, would not justify reversal of the physician's
conviction. 118
The Tenth Circuit dealt with a somewhat different fifth amendment
problem in United States v. Scott. 119 There, an appellant's statement to federal
agents was used by the Government to impeach his testimony at trial. The
appellant alleged that before the statement could be used to impeach him,
the Government was required to show that the statement had been volunta-
rily given. Indeed, the appellant cited Wheeler v. United States1 2 0 which held
in part that "it is reasonable to require the Government to meet the burden
of showing that the statement was voluntarily made after the accused had
been fully advised of all his rights and had effectively waived them in ac-
cordance with the standards prescribed by Miranda."'' But the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that the matter had been resolved to the contrary by the Supreme
Court in Harris v. New York 122 which held that statements made by a defend-
ant subject to custodial interrogation could be used to impeach him even
though the requirements of Miranda had not been met. 123 Thus, the court
held that Wheeler was no longer controlling in such a situation and that, in
the absence of a specific allegation or evidence of coercion or duress, the
Government was not required to prove that a statement was voluntarily
given before its introduction for impeachment purposes.
124
C. Double Jeopard
In United States v. Hujinan,'2 5 the appellant entered into a leasing agree-
ment with a Chicago company whereby he leased a tractor-trailer unit for
hauling goods from Illinois to California. The cargo, which was also part of
the leasing arrangement, consisted of canned hams and ham hocks. During
the course of the trip the appellant, apparently without authority, sold the
hams and ham hocks for his private gain. The defendant was located and
subsequently charged with theft of government property.
26
Sometime after the case had been set for trial, the Government discov-
ered that title to the cargo had not yet vested in the United States at the
117. 583 F.2d at 1138-39.
118. Id. at 1139.
119. 592 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1979).
120. 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967).
121. 592 F.2d at 114.
122. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
123. 592 F.2d at 1141.
124. In Scott the court found no evidence of coercion or duress. Id. at 1142.
125. 595 F.2d 551 (10th Cir. 1979).
126. Id. at 553. The theft charges were filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 642 (1976),
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time the defendant allegedly sold the ham. Thus, the Government moved to
dismiss the theft of government property charge and filed new charges alleg-
ing that appellant was guilty of theft from an interstate shipment. 127 On the
trial date the Government renewed its motion, but the court ordered a jury
impaneled in the cause sworn. After this was done the Government advised
the court that it could not prove that the hams had belonged to the United
States. As a result the court granted judgement of acquittal for the defend-
ant. 128
Later the appellant was tried and convicted of the theft from an inter-
state shipment charge. He argued (1) that conviction on the second charge
had subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment;
or in the alternative (2) that the Government was collaterally estopped from
introducing evidence at the second trial of any element of which he had been
acquitted of on the theft of government property charge. 1
29
In response to the double jeopardy claim, the Government, citing Unied
States v. Appawoo,' 3 0contended that it was entitled to appeal from the previ-
ous judgement of acquittal, since the acquittal allegedly had been improp-
erly granted, and that the court should have heard the motion to dismiss
before the jury had been impaneled.'
3 1
The Tenth Circuit ruled against the Government on this point by dis-
tinguishing Appawoo from the instant case on the ground that no appeal
from the preceding acquittal had been made by the Government. Rather,
the Government was, in a subsequent proceeding, attempting to attack the
validity of the acquittal on the theft of government property charge.' 3 2 The
Government's second contention, with respect to the appellant's double
jeopardy claim, was that the respective charges were separate and distinct,
and thus there would be no violation of the appellant's right not to be sub-
jected to double jeopardy. The court agreed, and held, in overruling the
appellant's first point that each of the statutes in question contained an addi-
tional element requiring proof not required in the other.133 Thus, trying the
appellant on the subsequent charge did not violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy.134 At the same time, the court declined to adopt the "same
transaction rule" urged by the appellant, which would allow the prosecution
to charge only one crime per any given incident of criminal activity by a
given defendant.
135
The court then addressed the appellant's collateral estoppel claim, not-
127. 595 F.2d at 553.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977). Appawoo was consolidated on appeal with United
States v. Casey, 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977).
131. 595 F.2d at 554.
132. d.
133. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See a/so Cox v. Gaffney, 459
F.2d 50 (10th Cir.), cert denid, 409 U.S. 863 (1972).
134. 595 F.2d at 554-55.
135. Id See United States v. Addington, 471 F.2d 560, 568 (10th Cir. 1973); Birch v. United
States, 451 F.2d 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Note, DoubleJeopardy. Mu/lip/e Prosecutlions
Aritgfrom the Same Transaction, 15 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 259 (1977-78).
1980]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ing that the standard for review was one of rationality, "with a practical
frame with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings."' 136 Thus the
court carefully examined the lower court record and determined that, as the
Government had urged, the only issue to which the collateral estoppel claim
could apply was the issue of the government's ownership of the ham. Since
this issue was not an element of the theft from an interstate shipment charge
the appellant's fifth amendment claims failed and his conviction was af-
firmed. 137
In United States v. Rtch,' 38 the Tenth Circuit dealt with a somewhat dif-
ferent double jeopardy question. In Rich, the appellant was charged with
committing fraud on a bankruptcy trustee. 139 His first trial ended in a mis-
trial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. At retrial, a jury was
selected without the appellant being present but with his consent. Then,
before the trial could proceed any further, the Government was granted a
continuance because its key attorney could not be present to begin the
trial. 140 For about six weeks neither the Government nor the appellant at-
tempted to move the case to trial. One day the appellant's attorney met the
judge in the hallway of the federal courthouse and the men went to the
judge's chambers. The trial judge asked the defense attorney if he really
wanted to try the case. The defense attorney replied that he did not and
that he felt his client was innocent and should never have been charged.
The judge instructed his clerk to prepare an order discharging the jury. Ap-
pellant's counsel told the judge that if the jury was discharged he would
oppose his client's retrial on double jeopardy grounds.' 4 ' The judge made
no reply and the jury was discharged, without notification of the Govern-
ment's attorneys.
In a subsequent hearing, the appellant moved for dismissal of the in-
dictment against him on the grounds of double jeopardy and upon a claim
that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial in contravention of
the sixth amendment.1
42
The Government submitted that the retrial was not barred by the
double jeopardy clause because, in his conversation with the trial judge, ap-
pellant's attorney had impliedly consented to the jury's discharge. Further,
the Government argued that the double jeopardy issue had to be resolved in
its favor because the conversation between the defense counsel and the trial
judge had brought about a termination of the prosecution of the appellant
136. 595 F.2d at 555.
137. Id. at 555-56. Set Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Ashe held that whenever an
ultimate issue of fact has been litigated in a defendant's favor, it may not be relitigated by the
prosecution in a subsequent proceeding against the defendant. See also Collateral and Equitable
Estoppel ofFederal Criminal Defendants, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1221 (1976); Note, Crinznal Laic-
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel and the Mutually Exclusive Offense Rule, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
691 (1975); and Rich, Collateral Estoppel- A Constitutional Cuarantee, 50 B.U. L. REV. 604 (1970).
138. 589 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1978).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
140. 589 F.2d at 1026-27.
141. Id. at 1027.
142. Even though the appellate court ruled that Rich could not be retried, it did note that
the trial court had erred in holding that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Id.
at 1033-34.
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without a factual determination of the latter's guilt or innocence on the
charge. 1
43
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the general rule was
that jeopardy attaches with the impaneling and swearing of a jury.' 44 The
court, however, acknowledged that there were exceptions to this general
rule. The Tenth Circuit stated that, absent prosecutorial or judicial miscon-
duct or bad faith, the trial judge may declare a mistrial, even against the
wishes of a defendant when such action is warranted by "manifest neces-
sity."'1 45 But the court noted that none of the many policy reasons behind
the ban on double jeopardy were applicable to the appellant in this case. He
had not been subjected to the embarrassment, expense and ordeal which
many defendants face after their trials had begun. Nor could it be argued
that the swearing and impaneling of the jury had subjected Rich to intense
mental anguish since he had not been present when it was selected.146 Nev-
ertheless, the court held, citing Cnit v. Bretz, 14 1 that the appellant could not
be retried. 148 After noting that one of the major interests which the double
jeopardy clause seeks to protect is the right of the accused to have a particu-
lar chosen jury decide the case, the Tenth Circuit held that Crzst made it
plain that:
[J]eopardy attaches in a criminal trial when the jury is empaneled
and sworn and that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a subse-
quent prosecution of a defendant whose previous trial has ended
with the discharge of the jury before it has rendered a verdict un-
less: (1) findings of "manifest necessity" justifying the trial court's
discharge of the first jury appear by express declaration of the
court, regardless of the terminology of the order or are apparent
from the trial court record, or (2) the defendant consents to the
trial court's order discharging the jury upon either the Govern-
ment's or the trial court's motion, or waives the right to later object
thereto. 149
The appellate court then noted that there was no evidence that the trial
judge had acted in bad faith or that the decision to discharge the jury had
been dictated by manifest necessity. After examining the statements made
by the defense counsel to the judge, the court concluded that the statements
would hardly be considered consent or waiver of a double jeopardy objec-
tion.S ° Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held that the appellant's attorney had
not expressly nor impliedly consented to the trial court's action. Even if the
attorney had, retrial would still be precluded since the attorney was not em-
143. Id. at 1027.
144. Id. at 1028. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); United States v. Fay, 553
F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1977).
145. 589 F.2d at 1028. See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Simmons v.
United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
146. 589 F.2d at 1029-30.
147. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
148. 589 F.2d at 1030. See also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
149. 589 F.2d at 1031-32. See generally Comment, Crinminal Law---Double Jeopardy--Retrial Af-
ter Sua Sponte. Declaration of Mistnal Over Defendant's Objecttn Prohibited Where Record Discloses a
Viable Alternative to Mistrial, 10 Rtr.-CAM. L.J. 457 (1979).
150. 589 F.2d at 1032.
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powered to waive such a fundamental right for his client without first in-
forming him and receiving permission to give such consent. 15 1 Thus, the
Government was barred from retrying the appellant on the same charge.
In United States v. Padila,152 the Tenth Circuit had occasion to address a
claim by the appellant that the U.S. Attorney's Office was not abiding by
the Petite policy 153 set down by the U.S. Department of Justice. In Padilla,
the appellant was charged by the State of New Mexico with trafficking her-
oin. The appellant, pursuant to a plea bargaining agreement with state
prosecutors, pleaded guilty to one count and was given a three year deferred
sentence. The state did not prosecute the remaining five counts. Thereafter
the state prosecutor became an Assistant U.S. Attorney. 154 Subsequently,
appellant was indicted by a federal grand jury on five counts of possession
with the intent to distribute and one count of the distribution of heroin.'
55
The indictment was based upon the same transaction which had been the
foundation of the aforementioned state charges.
On appeal, the appellant asserted three grounds for the dismissal of the
federal charges against him: (1) the plea bargaining agreement between
himself and state prosecutors was binding on the Government since the then
state prosecutor became the Government attorney responsible for prosecut-
ing the appellant in federal court; (2) the double jeopardy clause precluded
the government from trying him on the federal charges because they arose
out of the same transactions which were the subjects of the state charges to
which he had pleaded guilty; and (3) his rights had been violated by the
failure of the Government to follow its own Petite policy.
The Tenth Circuit noted that there was no evidence that the state plea
bargaining agreement had been designed to encompass the possibility of a
subsequent federal prosecution, and therefore ruled against the appellant on
that point. 156 With respect to the appellant's double jeopardy claim, the
court, quoting extensively from United States v. Lanza,' 57 held: "We have
here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources capable of deal-
ing with the same subject-matter within the same territory. . . .Each gov-
ernment [state and federal] in determining what shall be an offense against
its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the
other."' 5 8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the federal prosecution
was not precluded by the fact that state charges had been filed and resolved
against the defendant, although both arose out of the same incident.
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the Petite policy argument. That pol-
icy, promulgated by the Justice Department, dictates that following a state
151. Id.
152. 589 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1978).
153. See text accompanying note 158 in~fa.
154. Id. at 483.
155. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
156. 589 F.2d at 484.
157. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
158. 589 F.2d at 484 (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). See also
Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties, and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cmii. L. REV. 591
(1961); Pontikes, DualSoereignty and Double Jeopardy, A Critique ofBartkus v. Illinois and Abbate
v. United States, 14 W. REs. L. REV. 700 (1963).
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prosecution there should not be subsequent federal prosecution for offenses
arising out of the same transaction in the absence of "compelling federal
interests."' 59 Also, the decision to commence a federal prosecution in such
an instance should be made only with the approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. The court first chastised the U.S. Attorney's Office for not re-
vealing in its brief whether the permission of the Attorney General had been
forthcoming, or for that matter even sought. Since the court had no way of
determining that issue, it proceeded assuming that permission had not been
given.' 6° Still, the court held, failure of the prosecutors to abide by the Petite
policy would not result in the dismissal of the charges against the appellant.
Citing several recent Tenth Circuit cases, the court held that:
[T]he Petite policy does not confer an enforceable right on the de-
fendant in the absence of government request for dismissal. We
. . .called attention to the previous line of decision on this subject,
noting that in each instance in which Petite was applied it had
been invoked at the request of the United States and not over the
government's objection. . . .We also pointed out that it was a pol-
icy statement of the Department of Justice; that it was based upon
the Attorney General's determination that fairness required it; and
that it was not a regulation but simply a housekeeping provision.
The Attorney General's statement, to be sure, was distributed to
the U.S. Attorneys. . . .It followed then that the failure to obtain
the Attorney General's approval resulted in there being no enforce-
able right in the defendant.
161
Judge Logan concurred, but only because he believed he was bound by case
law. 162 He noted that the instant case showed just why the Petite policy had
become necessary and advocated that the Government should be required to
follow the policy, in part, to avoid unfairness to a defendant. '
6 3
Thus, it appears that appellants will continue to raise Petite policy chal-
lenges to their convictions despite a solid reluctance on the part of the appel-
late courts to grant relief on those grounds. But it is also apparent that not
all appellate judges feel judicial restraint should rule the day when the Gov-
ernment violates the Petite policy.
In United States v. Bowzh'ne, 16 4 the defendants were tried on a conspiracy
charge. t6 5 After several days of trial, the trial court dismissed the charge,
holding that the evidence indicated there had been more than one conspir-
acy. But the judge specifically held that retrial of the defendants was not
barred by the dismissal. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dis-
missal of the conspiracy charge and then evaluated the case to determine if a
159. 589 F.2d at 484.
160. Id. at 485.
161. Id. (citing United States v. Valenzuela, 584 F.2d 374, 376 (10th Cir. 1978)). &e also
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184 (10th
Cir.), cer. dened, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
162. 589 F.2d at 485 (Logan, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 486. See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121 (1959).
164. 593 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1979).
165. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976).
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subsequent retrial was barred on double jeopardy grounds.' 66
The appellate court held that retrial was not precluded. In doing so,
the court relied upon several recent cases which held that when a mistrial is
declared at the request of the defendant, retrial is not barred, as contrasted
with the situation when the mistrial is granted as the result of the Govern-
ment's evidence, or due to prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching.16 7 In
Bowline, the Tenth Circuit reasoned the mistrial was declared as a result of
the invalidity of the charge and the lower court's decision did not go to the
merits of the case. Further, the mistrial was not the result of misconduct or
overreaching on the part of the prosecutor.168
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Holloway stated his belief that retrial of the
defendants was barred by the double jeopardy clause. Relying on the court
record, and the fact that the basis for the trial court's declaration of a mis-
trial was that the evidence indicated there had been more than one conspir-
acy. Judge Holloway concluded that the declaration of mistrial had gone, at
least partially, to the merits of the case. Thus despite the lower court's belief
that retrial was available, the judge felt the mistrial was the result of the
Government's failure to prove the single conspiracy set out in the indict-
ment. 169
In a companion case United States v. Leonard,170 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the question of whether the mistrial declared by the trial court was
due to prosecutorial misconduct. The essential facts were the same as in the
Bowhne case, and the same defendants were involved. In Leonard, however,
the double jeopardy issue arose out of a somewhat different situation. There,
the trial court granted the defendants a mistrial on the basis that the prose-
cutor had failed to comply fully with both statutory and judicial discovery
orders. 17' The trial court, however, noted that it believed the prosecutor
had not complied with the discovery orders because he was not " 'informed
about the law,' "172 and not because he acted in bad faith. Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit primarily focused its analysis on whether the trial court's find-
ing of lack of bad faith was supported by the trial record. From the record
the appellate court concluded that the prosecutor had not intentionally
failed to comply with discovery orders in an attempt to provoke a mistrial or
to prejudice the defendants.1 73 While not actually reaching a determination
with respect to whether the trial court's evaluation was correct, the Tenth
Circuit held that even if the actions of the prosecutor in this case could be
said to have been in bad faith, that fact alone would not support a decision
166. 593 F.2d at 947-48.
167. Id. at 948. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424
U.S. 600 (1976).
168. 593 F.2d at 948-49.
169. Id. at 949-51 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
170. 593 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1979).
171. Id. at 953. The Government attorney had failed to comply with the Jencks Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). See generally Comment, Expanding Defendant's Discovery: TheJencks Act at
Pretn alt1eangs, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 419 (1975); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecu-
tor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 112 (1972).
172. 593 F.2d at 953.
173. Id. at 954.
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that retrial of the defendants was precluded on double jeopardy grounds.
Citing United States v. Dinitz,17 4 the court held that the bad faith must have
had the impact of provoking the mistrial request. In the instant case, the
court could not find that the decision of the lower court was erroneous.
1 75
The defendants in United States v. Horn 176 were convicted of submitting
false exemption statements to their employers, 177 claiming they had incurred
no federal income tax liability for the 1976 taxable year. The defendants,
who were husband and wife, were tried jointly but after the jury had deliber-
ated about three and a half hours the jury foreman sent the court a note
stating that the jury appeared to be deadlocked.
178
Upon receiving the note the trial judge recessed the proceedings for the
night. The jury resumed its deliberations at about 9 a.m. the following
morning after the judge read the jury a formal Allen charge. 1 79 Less than
two hours later the jury was brought back into the courtroom and the judge
declared a mistrial due to the jury deadlock. The judge did not ask the jury
foreman if the panel had made any progress towards reaching a unanimous
verdict that morning nor did the judge poll the individual jury members to
determine if the jurors felt a consensus might be reached.
On appeal the defendants argued that their retrial on the same charges
was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The de-
fendants contended that no "manifest necessity" had existed which justified
the trial judge sua sponte declaring the mistrial. 1
80
After reviewing many of the cases which had attempted to interpret the
term "manifest necessity,"'' the Tenth Circuit concluded that, in the case
at bar, two factors were controlling: 1) the shortness of the jury deliberations
in this case;' 8 2 and 2) the fact that the trial judge, at the time of the declara-
174. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
175. 593 F.2d at 954-55.
176. 583 F.2d 1124 (10th Cir. 1978).
177. 26 U.S.C. § 7205 (1976).
178. 583 F.2d at 1125.
179. Se- Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
180. 583 F.2d at 1126.
181. See, e.g., Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978) (seven criteria listed:
(1) a timely objection by defendant; (2) the jury's collective opinion that it cannot agree; (3) the
length of the deliberations of the jury; (4) the length of the trial; (5) the complexity of the issues
presented to the jury; (6) any proper communications which the judge has had with the jury;
and (7) the effects of possible exhaustion and the impact which coercion of further deliberations
might have on the verdict).
The evolution of the proper standard of review of mistrial declarations has gone from the
initial recitation of "manifest necessity," United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824);
through a period of permitting the trial court great discretion, Gori v. United States, 367 U.S.
364 (1961) and Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); up to a recent attempt to
require the trial judge to undertake a search for procedural alternatives to declaring a mistrial,
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); and finally back into confusion with a decision
seeming to overemphasize the public interest in prosecuting alleged criminals, possibly to the
point of derogation of the accused's right to have his trial completed before a particular tribu-
nal, Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). The Tenth Circuit, however, chose not to deal
extensively with Somervitle, and instead followed a line of cases stressing the trial court's obliga-
tion to conduct an affirmative inquiry of the jury as to the state of its deliberations. Eg., United
States ex ret Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973).
182. 583 F.2d at 1128, 1129. United States ex ret. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516
F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975).
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tion of a mistrial, had failed to determine that the jury was hopelessly dead-
locked.' 83 Since neither review of the record nor consideration of the factors
listed above lead the Tenth Circuit to believe there had been a showing of a
"manifest necessity" mandating the declaration of a mistrial, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court's holding that the defendants could be retried




In Twyman v. Crisp,'8 5 the Tenth Circuit considered three substantive
claims of an Oklahoma prisoner before affirming the decision of the trial
court denying the prisoner relief. Prisoner Twyman had alleged that he was
denied: adequate medical care; due process because of his reclassification
from medium to maximum security without an adequate reclassification
hearing; adequate access to prison law library facilities through hour restric-
tions; and access to the court by virtue of the prison's postage stamp policy.
At the outset the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a prisoner's claim of
denial of adequate medical treatment is a valid claim to raise in federal
court. The appellant's contention was that he had ulcers but that prison
officials had taken him off of his "bland diet" thereby subjecting him to cruel
and unusual punishment.'8 6 The court noted that in order to state a cause
of action upon which relief may be granted "a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs."' 8 7 After turning to the record in the case, which indicated
that any change in the appellant's diet was the result of administrative over-
sight or misunderstanding, the Tenth Circuit concluded that there was no
evidence of deliberate defiance of a medical order prescribing a special diet
for the appellant.18a Furthermore, the court noted that the appellant had
not carried his burden of proof, not only in respect to the deliberate conduct
requirement but also on the issue of the seriousness of the appellant's medi-
cal need for the special diet.'
8 9
The court also decided the reclassification issue in favor of the
Oklahoma prison officials. Pointing to the fact that under Oklahoma law
the Director of Corrections has "total discretion" in the area of prisoner
transfers, the Tenth Circuit held that the appellant had "no legitimate claim
of entitlement to remain in the general prison population" and that the deci-
sion to transfer the appellant to the maximum security section was "com-
pletely within the sphere of authority of prison officials."' 90
With respect to access to the prison law library, the Tenth Circuit stated
183. 583 F.2d at 1127, 1129.
184. Id. at 1129.
185. 584 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1978).
186. Id. at 354. Set also Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970).
187. 584 F.2d at 355 (citing West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1978)).
188. 584 F.2d at 355.
189. Id. Set Dickson v. Colman, 569 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
190. 584 F.2d at 355-57.
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that the appellant had not been able to show that he was prejudiced by
restricted access. The only evidence of prejudice presented by the appellant
in this regard was that because of the restrictions he had been forced to seek
continuances in certain cases. While this allegation might be true, the court
stated, it did not rise to the level of prejudice which would entitle Twyman
to relief. Indeed, the court noted that many practicing attorneys for a vari-
ety of reasons also are forced to seek court continuances.' 9'
With respect to the prison's stamp policy, the appellant relied upon the
recent Supreme Court decision in Bounds v. Smth' 92 which stated, in part:
"It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense
with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to au-
thenticate them, and with stamps to mail them."'
93
The Tenth Circuit noted that a literal reading of Bounds would tend to
support the appellant's claim. However, observing that the Oklahoma
prison in question made adequate provision of stamps for indigent prisoners
and that the appellant had been unable to show he had been substantially
prejudiced by the stamp policy, the court held that prisoners do not have an
unlimited right to free postage with respect to stamps for mail to be sent to
courts. As for the interpretation of the language in Bounds, the Tenth Circuit
found it best to leave that function to the Supreme Court.'
94
Possible remedies for the overcrowding in Oklahoma prisons were ex-
amined in Battle v. Anderson.195 This case grew out of a series of long-term
problems in the Oklahoma prison system. The trial court failed to grant the
state a continuance to permit preparation for a compliance hearing on the
overcrowding issue. After an extensive review of the lower court record, and
after remarking that it appeared the Oklahoma prison officials were comply-
ing with the trial court's initial order regarding overcrowding in good faith
and as rapidly as possible, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the lower
court.' 96 The appellate court concluded that it could not reach the merits of
the case since it was possible the trial court had not provided an adequate
opportunity for the prison officials to prepare for the hearing which was the
subject of the appeal.
B. Sentencing
In United States v. Davidson,19 7 the appellant, a prisoner at a federal
prison in Oklahoma, was convicted of assaulting a fellow inmate with the
intent to commit murder and of conveying a knife from place to place within
the prison.' 98 The trial judge sentenced him to ten years imprisonment on
the assault charge and a five year term on the conveying a knife count, the
191. Id. at 357. See also United States v. Evans, 542 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1976).
192. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
193. Id. at 824-25.
194. 584 F.2d at 359. See Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). Contra Craig v.
Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656 (D. Nev. 1975).
195. 594 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1979).
196. Id. at 792.
197. 597 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1979).
198. 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 1792 (1976).
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two sentences to be served concurrently. The court did not, however, specify
whether these sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively with the
bank robbery sentence which the appellant was then serving. The sentenc-
ing took place shortly before noon and the appellant was in the process of
being returned to the prison to serve the terms when the court ordered him
to appear before it to correct the oversight of the trial judge. The vehicle in
which the appellant was travelling was turned around and about one and
one-half hours after the initial sentencing the appellant was brought before
the court where the assault and conveying sentences were pronounced to run
consecutively with his bank robbery sentence. 199
On appeal, the appellant challenged the sentencing procedure, alleging
he had been subjected to double jeopardy. The Tenth Circuit, however,
disagreed and affirmed the sentencing of the trial court. The court drew a
distinction between judicial and executive custody, with the sentence not
commencing to run, and therefore jeopardy not attaching, until a convicted
person is received by the institution at which his sentence is to run.20
United States v. Ahgoom 20 1 presented an issue concerning sentencing
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA). In Ahgoom the trial court
sentenced the youthful appellant to an eight year prison term for his convic-
tion on an unlawful possession of firearms charge.20 2 Thus, the appellant
was not given the benefit of the more lenient FYCA statute. The appellant
thereafter filed for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The Tenth Circuit stated that the trial court had apparently ignored
Dorszynski v. United States2 °3 which had been handed down by the Supreme
Court several months prior to the sentencing of Ahgoom. Dorszynski held
that before a trial court could sentence a youth offender under the more
punitive adult sentencing provisions, the court must expressly find on the
basis of the court record that sentencing under the FYCA would not benefit
the defendant. 2 4 In the instant case, however, the only trial court finding
had been that the appellant's case minimally required an eight year sen-
tence.20 5 The Government argued that this finding showed the trial judge
had made an implicit finding that no benefit would be derived from sentenc-
ing the appellant under the FYCA. But the Tenth Circuit distinguished
several cases cited by the Government to that effect on the basis that they
were pre-Dorsynski decisions.2 0 6 Therefore, the court remanded the case to
the trial court for resentencing and the lower court's express findings as to
the possible benefits of sentencing the appellant under the FYCA.
199. 597 F.2d at 231, 232-33.
200. Id. at 233. See Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1964); Walton v.
United States, 202 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916 (1969). See also Pugh and Carver, Due Process and Sentencitg" From
Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEX. L. REV. 25 (1970).
201. 596 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1979).
202. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976).
203. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
204. Id. at 444.
205. 596 F.2d at 434.
206. Id. at 434. See McKnabb v. United States, 551 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1977); Coleman v.
United States, 532 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1976).
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C. Post- Trial Procedure
In United States v. Lucas,20 7 the Tenth Circuit dealt with the question of
whether an untimely pro se notice of appeal filed with the trial court con-
veyed jurisdiction to the appellate court to hear the appeal. The facts of the
case indicated that the appellant filed his pro se notice of appeal with the
district court twenty days after the date of judgement finding him guilty of
bank robbery. Thus, his filing was ten days overdue but still within the
thirty day extention period under rule 4(b).208 The Tenth Circuit, noting
that a determination was needed by the lower court of whether the late filing
of the notice was due to excusable neglect, remanded the case to the district
court where the appellant could file a motion for an extension of time to file
his notice of appeal.
20 9
D. Post-Conviction Relief
The issue in United States v. Talk2 1° was whether successive motions by a
prisoner made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 were barred by Supreme Court
Rule 9(b) when there had been an intervening parole hearing for the appel-
lant.2 1 ' Talk was convicted of rape on an Indian reservation 21 2 and, at his
first section 2255 hearing he alleged that the trial court which had sentenced
him had wanted him to be eligible for parole prior to serving a third of his
sentence. The hearing court denied his motion. After that, the appellant
received another parole hearing but was again denied parole prior to serving
a third of his sentence. The appellant then filed another section 2255 mo-
tion, again alleging that he should be paroled prior to serving a third of his
sentence. The hearing court dismissed the appellant's motion as successive.
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the lower court's decision, held that rule
9(b) was broad enough to bar the second motion as successive since his prior
motion had been determined on the merits and thus the motion in the case





In United States v. Barron,2 1 4 the Tenth Circuit dealt with the affirmative
defense of entrapment. The facts indicated that one of the defendants, Bar-
ron, was involved in the sale of drugs to federal undercover agents. He was
tried and convicted of possession with the intent to distribute
207. 597 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1979).
208. FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
209. 597 F.2d at 245-46.
210. 597 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1979).
211. Id. at 249-50.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). The appellant was sentenced pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4208(a)(2) (1976).
213. 597 F.2d at 250-51.
214. 594 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1979).
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methamphetamine. 21 5 On appeal, he alleged that his conviction should be
reversed because he was entrapped into committing the crime by the govern-
ment agents. The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by inquiring into the
assertion that the defense of entrapment had been established by Barron as a
matter of law. Citing United States v. Gum/l, 216 the court set out the rule of
law as "whether there is undisputed evidence which shows conclusively and
unmistakably that an innocent person was induced to commit the act com-
plained of by trickery or fraud of a government agent."' 217 Further, the
court stated that in order for the appellant to establish entrapment it must
appear that he was "an innocent dupe" and that the agents were the prime
movers in causing him to commit the crime in question.
2 18
The Tenth Circuit held, however, that the evidence presented at trial
indicated that Barron was involved in the planning and preparation of at
least one of the drug transactions with which the appellants were charged.
Thus, the court held that the evidence had failed to establish, and, in fact,
was totally inconsistent with Barron's allegation of entrapment.2 1 9 The
court also noted that the conduct of the government agents in the present
case could not be said to have been "generally outrageous." It did hold,
however, that the appellant could, and did, have the entrapment issue sub-
mitted to the jury.
220
In United States v. Szycher,2 2' the appellant was charged with possession
with the intent to distribute cocaine. 222 The appellant's entrapment claim
arose out of the allegations that while dealing with federal undercover drug
agents he became frightened and was afraid not to comply with their re-
quests that he furnish them drugs. Also, the appellant claimed he had been
induced to enter into the drug deals with the agents as the result of the
activities of an informer whom the Government had recruited while the in-
former was in government custody on drug related charges.
At the conclusion of the evidence at trial, the appellant made an oral
motion to dismiss the charges, later supplemented by a written motion, as-
serting that the actions of the informer were so outrageous and illegal as to
rise to the level of a denial of due process. The trial court denied the appel-
215. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1976).
216. 522 F.2d 20, 23 (10th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Rosenfeld, 545 F.2d 98 (10th
Cir. 1976). For general discussion of the doctrine of entrapment see Murchison, The Entrapment
Defense in Federal Couris. Modern Developments, 47 Miss. L.J. 573 (1976); Note, Criminal Procedure-
The Entrapment Defense-Determination of Predisposition, 11 LAND & WATER L. REv, 265 (1976)
(citing Wyoming cases), and Note, The Entrapment Defense-What Hath the Model Penal Code
Wrought?, 16 Duo. L. REv. 157 (1977-78).
217. 594 F.2d at 1349.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1349-50. See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); United States v.
Williams, 488 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1973).
220. 594 F.2d at 1349-50. See United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976).
221. 585 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1978).
222. In addition to the defense of entrapment, the appellant challenged his conviction on
the ground that there was no rational basis for the classification of cocaine as a Schedule II
controlled substance. The court rejected this argument, commenting that it had been raised
and found to be without merit on many previous occasions. Id. at 444-45. See also United States
v. Maryland Savings Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4 (1970); United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d
1279 (1976).
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lant's motion, and while noting that the informer had, as alleged by the
appellant, apparently used cocaine in the presence of the appellant and the
government agents, that this activity did not rise to the level of entrap-
ment.2 23 The trial judge further stated that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the Government to sustain its burden of showing the appel-
lant's predisposition to commit the crime charged and that the issue of en-
trapment had been properly submitted to the jury.
224
The Tenth Circuit, noting that government agents can "employ appro-
priate artifice and deception to ferret out illegal activities," held that the
decision of the trial court with respect to the appellant's motion was not
clearly erroneous and it therefore affirmed the decision of the lower court.
22 5
The appellant also challenged the trial court's jury instruction on the
entrapment issue. The appellant contended that the Government was re-
quired to show, not only a predisposition on the part of the appellant to
commit the crime charged, but also, that in the absence of any government
involvement that the appellant would still have been likely to commit the
crime. Therefore, the appellant asserted that the trial court had erred in not
so instructing the jury. The Tenth Circuit rejected this broad interpretation
of entrapment and declined to adopt such a definition of the defense.
226
B. Trial Court Discretion
The practices of Government witnesses were examined by the Tenth
Circuit in United States o. Priest.2 27 In that case the appellant was charged
with illegal making, possession, and transfer of a sawed-off shotgun.228 He
was tried b a jury and convicted of all three counts. The Government's
undercover agents, who purchased and witnessed the purchase of the firearm
from the appellant, testified at trial that shortly after the sale they had made
a written record of "their recollection of [the] events."'229 The writings were
transcribed into typed reports and the handwritten reports and notes were
thereafter destroyed. The record revealed that at least one of the witnesses
compared the notes and the typed reports and testified that the reports accu-
rately reflected the material contained in the notes.
2 30
The defense attorney was allowed to examine the typed reports, but at
trial, he objected to the fact the original notes had been destroyed. Based
upon this complaint, the defense counsel moved to strike the testimony of the
witnesses whose notes had been destroyed. The trial court advised the Gov-
ernment that it disapproved of the practice of destroying the notes, but exer-
cising its discretion, refused to strike the testimony of the Government
223. 585 F.2d at 447-48.
224. Id. at 447-49.
225. Id. at 449.
226. Id. at 449-50. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Accord Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
227. 594 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1979).
228. These offenses violated 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(fd,e) (1976) respectively.
229. 594 F.2d at 1384.
230. Id. at 1385.
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witnesses.2 31 The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court had acted correctly,
since there was no indication that the witnesses, in destroying the notes, had
acted in bad faith nor that the appellant's defense had been prejudiced by
this practice.
232
Another assignment of error by the appellant in Priest dealt with the
refusal of the appellant's offer of proof that a potential defense witness, if
called, would testify that the appellant had acted as an informant for a state
law enforcement agency and had provided it with valuable information con-
cerning a number of crimes. The trial court rejected the offer as irrelevant
and immaterial to the case at bar. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that
the admissibility of this sort of evidence was peculiarly within the realm of
discretion reserved for the trial court and, finding no abuse of discretion, the
appellate court affirmed Priest's convictions.
233
One of the issues in UnitedStates o. Watson2 34 was whether the trial court
had abused its discretion in admitting into evidence tape recordings of cer-
tain telephone conversations incriminating the appellants. At trial, the ap-
pellants' attorneys objected to the use of the tapes on the ground that they
were unintelligible and inaudible. The Tenth Circuit first noted that unless
the tapes were so unintelligible as to render the recording as a whole untrust-
worthy, then the admission of the tapes was a matter "within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. '235 In concluding that the trial judge had not
erred in admitting the tapes into evidence, the appellate court stated it had
listened to the tapes and found that they were not so unintelligible that they
could be said to be untrustworthy.
2 36
Next, the appellants contended the trial court had erred in providing
the jury with transcripts of the tapes to aid the jury in understanding the
substance of the conversation. Evidence was offered as to the accuracy of the
transcripts. Furthermore, the trial judge had instructed the jury that the
transcripts were to be used only to aid it in understanding the tapes and
were not to be considered as evidence. This limiting instruction was re-
peated by the court on several occasions during the appellant's trial.
23 7
Also, the Tenth Circuit noted that the transcripts had not, in fact, been in-
troduced into evidence. Therefore, the use of the transcripts was held to be
within the proper bounds of the trial court's discretion.
238
In United States v. Bowers,239 the Tenth Circuit faced a situation where
the Government had not adquately complied with discovery and, thus, had
231. Id.
232. Id See also United States v. Stulga, 584 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Martin, 565 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dupree, 553 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1977).
233. 594 F.2d at 1385. Accord United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 904 (1977).
234. 594 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1979).
235. Id. at 1335. See also United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Jones, 540 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977).
236. 594 F.2d at 1336.
237. Id.
238. Id. See also United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962
(1975).
239. 593 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979).
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violated a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. 240 The Government, rather
than providing the defendant with the discoverable material replied merely
that the material would be made available to the appellant prior to trial. At
trial, the judge allowed the admission into evidence of the materials in ques-
tion even though the Government had not discharged its affirmative duty to
advise the appellant of its possession of the material.
24'
The Tenth Circuit, after noting the Government's response had failed
to comply with discovery requirements, held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in allowing the items to be admitted into evidence.
Since the appellant had been unable to demonstrate that the admission of
items resulted in "substantial prejudice" to him, his conviction was af-
firmed.
242
C. Evidence of Prior Convictions
In United States v. Gili/and,243 the Tenth Circuit dealt with the propriety
of certain questions asked by the Government of a defense witness concern-
ing criminal convictions of the appellant some 14 to 34 years prior to the
offense for which the appellant was on trial. The appellant was convicted of
transporting a stolen automobile across state lines in violation of the Dyer
Act. 244 At trial, the defense called the appellant's stepson as a witness to the
alleged purchase of the vehicle in question by the appellant.
On cross-examination the Government asked the stepson questions con-
cerning the appellant's character. The witness testified that appellant's
character was good. The Government then asked the witness if he were
aware that the appellant had twice been convicted of Dyer Act violations
and twice of forgery, all of the convictions being over ten years old. Later in
the trial, the appellant and the appellant's wife took the witness stand and
these prior convictions were again raised in questioning. On appeal before
the Tenth Circuit, the Government argued that the questions asked of the
stepson were justified because that witness was attempting to testify for the
appellant as a character witness.
245
The Tenth Circuit, quoting rule 404(b), laid out the general rule that
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity there-
with."'246 If the defendant, however, makes good character an issue then the
Government is permitted to use evidence of the defendant's prior convictions
to rebut the character evidence, the court stated. But in the case at bar, the
Tenth Circuit held, these were not the facts. Rather, the Government had
attempted to turn the stepson, initially an eyewitness to the alleged purchase
240. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
241. 593 F.2d at 379. See also Rice, Criminal Defense Discovery. A Prelude toJustice or an Interlude
for Abuse, 45 Miss. L.J. 887 (1974) (citing Mississippi cases); Note, Crimtnzal Procedure-Discoverq-
Movement TowardFull Disclosure, 77 W. VIR. L. REV. 561 (1974-75) (citing West Virginia cases).
242. 593 F.2d at 379. See also United States v. Hodges, 480 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1973).
243. 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1978).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976).
245. 586 F.2d at 1386-88.
246. Id. at 1388 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
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of the car by the appellant, into a character witness for the appellant by
asking the witness questions about the appellant's good character. 24 7 Thus,
contrary to Michelson v. United States,248 the Government had introduced evi-
dence concerning the appellant's prior convictions without the accused hav-
ing put his character at issue. Therefore, the Government improperly
brought out evidence of the appellant's prior convictions.
249
The Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. Burkhart,250 a Dyer Act case
where the Government brought out evidence of the defendant's prior Dyer
Act convictions some 4 and 15 years prior to the charges for which he was on
trial. The Burkhart court held:
First, the accused is required to defend charges which are not de-
scribed in the information or indictment. As a result he is required
to defend past actions which he may have in the past answered and
with respect to which he may have even served his sentence. Thus,
he is in effect tried as a recidivist though such a charge is not a part
of the federal criminal code.
25 1
Since in the instant case the prior convictions were even older than
those rejected in Burkhart, they were even less relevant, the Tenth Circuit
held.25 2 Moreover, the appellate court held that any defect in the Govern-
ment's actions had not been subsequently waived by the appellant when he
took the witness stand to testify in his own behalf. Because the convictions
were over ten years old they could not be used to impeach the appellant
unless the trial court determined that the prior convictions were of especially
high probative value outweighing any possible prejudicial effect and unless
the appellant had been given prior written notice of the Government's intent
to use such evidence. After examining the record, the Tenth Circuit found
neither of the tests had been met. Therefore the appellate court reversed the
appellant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
2 53
D. Suftciengy of the Evidence
In United States v. Smurthwaite,2 54 a physician practicing as a weight con-
trol specialist was convicted of eleven counts of illegally dispensing and dis-
tributing controlled substances. 25 5 The appellant challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence and specifically the fact that, at the close of the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief, there had been no evidence concerning the usual course
of practice of a doctor in his field. At the close of the Government's case, the
appellant made a motion for judgement of acquittal on the above ground
but the trial court deferred ruling on the motion. Afterward the Govern-
ment produced, as a rebuttal witness, a doctor who did testify as to the usual
course of practice for a naturopathic physician.
247. 586 F.2d at 1388-89.
248. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
249. 586 F.2d at 1389.
250. 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972).
251. Id. at 204.
252. 586 F.2d at 1390.
253. Id. at 1390-91.
254. 590 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1979).
255. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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The Tenth Circuit noted that the standard for reviewing whether to
grant the appellant's motion for acquittal was to consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government. 256 This, coupled with the fact that
the appellate court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
allowing the Government to produce rebuttal evidence which should have
been introduced in the Government's case-in-chief, was sufficient to sustain
the appellant's conviction. The evidence showed appellant had prescribed
diet pills to persons who were not overweight, that he had indicated he knew
his patients were not using the drugs for weight control but rather for par-
ties, and that most of the time he saw his patients only for a short time and
did not usually give them a physical examination before prescribing the
drugs.257 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that even if the Government
had wholly failed to produce any medical evidence on the course of medical
practice in the appellant's area, the decision of the lower court would still be
affirmed. This was because, as the court stated quoting United States V. Bar-
tee:2 58 "[T]he jury is not bound by such expert testimony and may, of
course, consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the prescrib-
ing as related by lay witnesses."
'259
E. Rule 10(c)
In United States v. Smaldone,26° the appellants urged the Tenth Circuit to
set aside their convictions on the basis that the court reporter had lost her
notes and, therefore, had been unable to transcribe the testimony of two of
the appellants. After it became apparent that the court reporter could not
locate the notes, the trial court invoked rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. 26 1 Pursuant thereto the appellants prepared a state-
ment of the lost evidence and a hearing was held at which the Government
made objections and amendments to the statement. The trial court then
approved the narrative as a substitute for the testimony of the two appel-
lants, and it was made part of the court record for appellate review.
The Tenth Circuit, noting that the gist of appellant's argument was
that reversible error was committed merely because of the lost notes, held
that rule 10(c) had been adopted for just such a situation. The entire pur-
pose of the rule was to provide a method for reconstructing a missing record
when an actual transcript could not for some reason be obtained.262 There-
fore, the conviction was affirmed since the statement provided a report
equivalent to that which would have been available had the preparation of a
transcript been possible.
256. 590 F.2d at 891. See also Speers v. United States, 387 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 956 (1968).
257. 590 F.2d at 890-91.
258. 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973).
259. 590 F.2d at 892 (quoting Bartee, 479 F.2d at 488).
260. 583 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1978).
261. FED. R. App. P. 10(c).
262. 583 F.2d at 1134. See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Morgan v.
Massey, 526 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1976).
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F. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
In United States v. Andrews,26 3 the Tenth Circuit addressed the applica-
bility of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The charges
against the appellant had arisen out of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
The court stated that the rule with respect to the exception is that testimony
which is otherwise hearsay will be admitted only after the existence of a
conspiracy is established by independent evidence. 264 Noting that the essen-
tial element of conspiracy is agreement to violate the law and that once a
conspiracy is established only slight evidence is required to implicate a co-
conspirator, the Tenth Circuit rejected the appellant's claim that the in-
dependent evidence of conspiracy was inadequate.
265
After reviewing the evidence the court held that the evidence of the
conspiracy was sufficient to allow the introduction of hearsay statements
made in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the other evidence
against the appellant was not strong.
266
G. Privileges
Interspousal privilege was the issue in United States v. Trammel.26 7 In
Trammel, the wife of one defendant was allowed to testify against all of the
defendants at their joint trial on charges of importation of heroin and of a
related conspiracy count.26 8 Trammel objected at trial to his wife's testi-
mony, basing his objection on a claim of interspousal privilege. Mrs. Tram-
mel was named in the indictment against the defendants as an unindicted
co-conspirator and she was given immunity from prosecution in exchange
for her testimony. This testimony dealt with the acts of her husband rather
than their private communications.
With great difficulty, the Tenth Circuit held that the interspousal privi-
lege was inapplicable on these particular facts and affirmed Trammel's con-
viction. The court began its analysis by distinguishing Hawkins v. United
Slates269 since in that case the witness-spouse was not subject to prosecution
for the same crime as that with which her husband was charged. But, in the
instant case, the court relied heavily on the fact that Mrs. Trammel was
liable for prosecution, prior to the grant of her immunity, for the crimes
about which she testified. 270 Thus, the court reasoned, to hold that she
263. 585 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1978).
264. Id. at 964. See Lowther v. United States, 455 F.2d 657 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
857 (1972).
265. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), (b) and 801(d) (2) (E). See also United States v. Petrozziello,
548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977). Cf United States v. Krohn, 573 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
deied, 98 S. Ct. 2857 (1979).
266. 585 F.2d at 965-66.
267. 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
268. 21 U.S.C. §§ 962(a), 963 (1976).
269. 358 U.S. 74 (1958). In Hawkins the Supreme Court recognized that the common law
husband-wife privilege was applicable in federal cases.
270. 583 F.2d at 1168-69. The confidential marital communication privilege bars introduc-
tion into evidence of confidential communications between spouses, United States v. Apodaca,
522 F.2d 568, 570 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Note,.Immuniyfiom Prosecution and the FijM Amendment:
An Analysts of Constituional Standards, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1972).
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could not testify would have resulted in the loss of her immunity and, there-
fore, the policy reason for the privilege of fostering domestic tranquility
would not, in this instance, be served by allowing the appellant to prevent
his wife from testifying.27t Citing the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court
held that the existence of a privilege must be determined " 'in the light of
reason and experience.' ",272 Here, the court pointed out Mrs. Trammel's
avoidance of prosecution, which was based on her promise to testify against
the defendants, and her use by the other defendants as a pawn in the crime
as reasons for ruling the privilege inapplicable in this case. 273 Furthermore,
the court stated that the Trammels were not a "family" in the usual sense of
the word, but rather, that their marriage had been a vehicle for criminal acts
which were "despicable and completely alien to anything conducive to the
preservation of a family relationship built around the legal status of mar-
riage."'2 74 Therefore, the court held, Trammel represented a situation in
which the interest of the public in bringing the defendants to justice out-
weighed any possible benefit to be gained by upholding the appellant's
claim of privilege.
2 75
Judge McKay dissented, stating that while the majority had noted the
general rule, they had adopted the exception. 276 Further, he predicted that
the decision of the majority would lead to undesirable consequences; specifi-
cally, in situations where spouses were accused of conspiracy regarding tax
matters. The dissenting judge also warned that the ruling would give gov-
ernment prosecutors almost unlimited discretion to "determine which shall
be worth saving and which shall not have the benefit of the common law
privilege." 277 This would be the result because the prosecutor could deter-
mine to whom and when grants of governmental immunity would be given.
Judge McKay also criticized the majority since, in his opinion, the decision
would do violence to the family:
And the home is, after all, a more important contributor to law
and order than is prosecution. If the homes fail, no number of
prosecutors, judges or jails could stem the tide of ensuing crime.
While the Trammel home is perhaps far from an ideal one, the
principle established in his case applies to all accused couples and
makes us unwitting partisans in the continuing assaults on the sta-
bility of the home-the root of true stability in any society.
278
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's criminal law and criminal procedure decisions dur-
271. 583 F.2d at 1169-70. See United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
272. 583 F.2d at 1170 (citing FED. R. EvID. 501). See also Baker v. United States, 329 F.2d
786 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 853 (1964).
273. 583 F.2d at 1170. The court characterized Mrs. Trammel as a "conduit" who was
merely "used" by the conspiracy. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1170-71.
276. Id. at 1171-72 (McKay, J., dissenting).




ing the survey period were, almost without exception, merely the application
of existing precedent to varying fact situations. Of the cases reviewed in this
survey United States v. Erb2 7 9 is certainly interesting due to its extreme fact
pattern but it is questionable if the decision breaks new ground in the area of
warrantless searches. United States v. Trammel,280 however, presents a differ-
ent situation. If affirmed by the Supreme Court, that decision would create
a significant new exception to the existing evidentiary marital privilege, ap-
plicable in all of the circuits and, perhaps, could be adopted by at least some
states.*
David M Conner
* The Tenth Circuit's decision in Trammel was unanimously affirmed
by the Supreme Court on February 27, 1980.
279. See notes 42-54 and accompanying text supra.
280. See notes 267-278 and accompanying text supra.
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